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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FREE PRESS: A COMMENT ON
SOME NEW TRENDS AND
SOME OLD THEORIES
William W. Van Alstyne*
After years of ever-advancing success in the Supreme Court,'
the "fourth estate" of newspapers now finds itself uncomfortably
hemmed in by an emerging succession of losses. 2 Providing financial solace to libel plaintiffs has contracted the definition of a public
figure, again exposing publications to substantial liability for mere
marginal inaccuracy. 3 Providing more elbow room for evidence* Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. (This article is adapted from a paper prepared for the American Bar Association's Extended Session in Sydney,
Australia, August 12, 1980. The original title, assigned by an ABA Special
Committee, was quite different: Why No First Amendment?-The Role of the Press
in Relation to Justice. Neither Australia nor New Zealand has any equivalent of our
first amendment. As the occasion of this joint session of the ABA was to compare legal developments in these countries (as well as in the United States) in commemoration of the bicentenary of William Blackstone's death in 1780, the original
point of the title was to raise a challenge to our ANZUS colleagues: Why don't they
have any first amendment? Given that condition, what indeed is the role of the press
in their schemes of social justice?
A portion of that emphasis in the original paper has been retained, but it is now
made incidental to a related subject of more immediate domestic interest in the
United States. We differ from our down-under allies not merely in having a first
amendment which protects freedom of expression in general; it explicitly [and separately?] protects "the freedom of the press" in particular. The question has lately
arisen as to why our own Supreme Court has made less of that fact than many have
urged it to do: i.e., why has "the press" not been specially and separately regarded
for purposes of first amendment analysis? The editors of the Hofstra Law Review recently published a Symposium on that subject. 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 559 (1979). This
adapted paper is offered merely as a postscript to that Symposium.)
1. See cases cited at notes 22-31 infra.
2. See cases cited at notes 32-42 infra. But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
3. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See also Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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seeking police now contemplates rummaging through newspaper

files. 4 State statutory privileges respecting a journalist's confidential
sources are made to yield to the discovery interests of criminal de-

fendants. 5 And first amendment press claims of editorial privacy
are subordinated to an infinite discovery process relentlessly pressed

6
by civil plaintiffs.
As the immunity and privacy of the newspapers' own enter-

prise seem less secure than may reasonably have been supposed in
the recent past, the press' access to sources of information has also
been curtailed. Thus, rather uncompelling administrative objec-

tions to press access to a very troubled jail have been held sufficient to limit the press to little more than a guided tour. 7 And

whatever may be the uncertain case when a criminal case comes to
actual trial, 8 pretrial hearings-where a very large portion of cases
are disposed of-appear not to be a place which journalists have
significant standing to attend.9

More exposed in its own accountability and more foreclosed
from investigating public accountability, the press has also encoun4. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
5. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
6. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
7. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
8. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (1980).
9. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). If certain dicta in Houchins
v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), and in Gannett represent a majority of the Supreme
Court (as I do not think they do), the contraction of access would be very great indeed. Thus, concurring in Gannett, Mr. Justice Rehnquist declared:
Despite the Court's seeming reservation of the question whether the First
Amendment guarantees the public a right of access to pretrial proceedings,
it is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First Amendment right of access in the public or the press to judicial or other governmental proceedings.
443 U.S. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). And in Houchins, Chief
Justice Burger stated that the extent, if any, to which a prison may be open to thirdparty access is a question which "invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly
a legislative task which the Constitution has left [wholly?] to the political processes." 438 U.S. at 12 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion). Neither statement commanded a majority in either case, however, and in fact there is no contemporary Supreme Court authority for either proposition as so broadly asserted. Cf. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2830-31 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Twice before, the Court has implied that any governmental restriction on
access to information, no matter how severe and no matter how unjustified, would be
constitutionally acceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large .... Today, however, for the first time,
the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important
information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected
by the First Amendment.") (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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tered newly sustained restrictions even in respect to its most conventional activity--disseminating news and views. This gloomy
conclusion appears to be particularly warranted if one's view of
"the press" is not restricted to merely conventional newspapers,
but includes its electronic cousin and its pamphleteering nephews,
as well as its scatological offspring. Thus, "adult" book stores may
be confined by zoning.' 0 Thus, the decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation" (sustaining a restriction on radio broadcasts of a ribald political satire) is restrictively reminiscent of the earlier discarded English test of obscenity which permitted the government
to bar language offensive to the most vulnerable persons. 12 Thus,
too, political placards may be forbidden by government in places
where commercial placards may nonetheless be displayed. Moreover, the decision in Greer v. Spock' 4 (sustaining a military commander's ban of leaflet distribution anywhere on an immense base
laced with open highways and in many respects suitable for distribution of ordinary political materials) cuts down the public
forum for the dissident and unconventional who lack newspapers of
their own.
The ostensible trend against the press may renew debate over
a suggestion originally put forward by one of the associate justices
of the Supreme Court.' 5 Little less than a decade ago, Mr. Justice
Stewart suggested that there may be distinctive functions and features of "the press" that ought to be noticed doctrinally by the Supreme Court. The first amendment itself appears on its face to imply the appropriateness of treating "press" cases as not merely
fungible with "speech" cases in first amendment adjudication. i6Accordingly, and especially if it is true that "the press" (even as confined to some subset such as professional journalists and newspa10. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
11. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
12. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
13. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). But cf. Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance permitting
peaceful labor picketing, but prohibiting other peaceful picketing, of schools).
14. 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976). For a related (and equally severe) decision, see
Brown Y. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
15. See Address by Mr. Justice Stewart, before the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation, New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in part as Or of
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
16. The first amendment sets forth an explicit, additional, prohibition of laws
abridging freedom of the press ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or [the freedom] of the press .... ) U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis
added).
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pers of general circulation) has recently been singled out with
particular neglect by the Supreme Court, recurring to Mr. Justice
Stewart's suggestion may now seem more timely than when originally advanced. That is, reconsideration of the idea may commend
itself as yielding some prospect of providing a better shelter than
the poor shelter press claims appear now to receive. Moreover,
even if it were not true that "the press" is in fact worse off than
others seeking adjudication of their first amendment claims, the
idea of reconsidering the logic of addressing "press" claims differently (and more sympathetically) might still commend itself. If all
are faring badly under today's judicial renderings of the first
amendment, that yields no reason why at least journalists and
newspapers of general circulation should not seek an appropriate,
more sheltered place of their own-especially if the first amendment itself contemplates that shelter.
The literature on this subject is, however, already very substantial, 1 7 and there is surely no purpose to be served by pretending to reinvent the wheel. Thus, this is but a comment on the
subject, and it proceeds briefly in three parts. First, simply for
perspective, it examines whether the press' own published impression that it has recently been treated with particular judicial harshness is well taken, i.e., is "the press" currently worse off under the
first amendment than others whose first amendment claims have
also been addressed by the Court in recent years? Second, it
reexamines whether the press should be treated differently than
others, at least insofar as that press (or some definable part of the
press) is critically linked with the larger public's ability to inform
its own speech. That is, why, indeed, is there as yet no "special"
17. I am heavily indebted to a great deal of that writing. See, e.g., Abrams, The
Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7
HOFSTRA L. REv. 563 (1979); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L.
REV. 731 (1977); Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 225; Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and
Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979); Jaxa-Debicki, Problems in Defining the Institutional Status of the Press, 11 RICH. L. REv. 177 (1976); Lange, The Speech and Press
Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Lewis, A PreferredPositionfor Journalism?,
7 HOFSTBA L. REv. 595 (1979); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a
Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639
(1975); Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1979); Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question:
Special ConstitutionalPrivilegefor the InstitutionalPress, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629
(1979); Comment, Examining the InstitutionalInterpretationof the Press Clause, 58
TEx. L. REV. 171 (1979). See also Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming
a "PreferredPosition," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977).
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first amendment fitted appropriately both to the press clause and
to the obvious relationship between the public interest and the
special protection of professional journalists? And third, virtually as
a postscript, consideration of this subject in terms of our first
amendment provides an appropriate place to say something about a
subject that should be interesting even to people understandably
impatient with the triviality of so much we write about particular,
recent, narrow, and merely fashionable topics of constitutional law.
The third section explores the issue of whether the existence of a
first amendment ultimately makes a difference between the degree
of American press freedom and the degree of press freedom enjoyed in such similar countries as Australia, England and New
Zealand.
Is "THE PRESS" WORSE OFF THAN OTHERS?
One clear impression emerges from this survey of more
than 175 years of press reaction to various freedom of expression
issues in the United States. It is that, except when their own
freedom was discernibly at stake, established general circulation
newspapers have tended to go along with efforts to suppress deviations from the prevailing political and social orthodoxies of
their time and place rather than to support the right to dissent.18
The felt need of professional journalists for greater breathing
room within the first amendment admittedly does not and need not
depend upon a belief that the press has received peculiarly short
shrift in the courts. Nonetheless, an impression that newspapers
are disfavored as a class is not without significant weight. If current
first amendment doctrine, though "neutral" on its face, seems to
weigh in with special harshness whenever a journalist or a newspaper is the litigant, then we are already at least half way home: We
have made the case that new doctrines are needed to offset the de
facto judicial prejudice against the press. The question as to
whether "the press" is practically worse off than others asserting
standing under the first amendment is not, therefore, of mere casual academic interest. The answer tends to affect our common
sense respecting the appropriateness of "reinterpreting" the first
amendment to combat any unfairness facilitated by the manipulability of current doctrines.
18.

J. LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 279

(1980).
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But important or not, the subject will not long detain us. Occasional editorial assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, 19 the
answer to the question is "No." The press is not worse off than
others, and the larger profile of first amendment cases of the immediate past decade provides no foundation at all for such a claim.
Rather, what may more accurately be observed is a more general
tendency that a number of recent press cases merely reflect: an
overall conservative judicial rendering of the first amendment. In
brief, press cases have simply been treated the same as other first
amendment claims, which is to say not very well or at least not as
well as some roughly equivalent claims were treated in the recent
past. The retrenchment is a general one,2 0 however, and provides
no basis for "special" press solicitude or the fashioning of special
press doctrines. The malaise, if it is a malaise, is one endured by a
larger body of first amendment persons. Correspondingly, the redress, if there is need for redress, should likewise respond equally
and across the board.
A review of the principal cases illustrates an earlier greater
and now lesser valuing of free speech in general. In 1964, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 2 1 the Supreme Court extolled "the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 2 2 sufficient to subordinate interests in reputation to protect even defamatory errors carelessly resulting from
hurried journalism. In 1971, the court italicized that preference for
a very free expression in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,23 de-

19. For examples of the severe reaction of some of the press to recent Supreme
Court decisions, see Address by Mr. Justice Brennan at the Dedication of the S. I.
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice, in Newark, N.J. (October 17, 1979), reprinted
at 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 174-75, 178, 180 (1979). See also J. LOFTON, supra note
18 passim.
20. A major exception to this statement may appear to be required by the fact
that "commercial" speech, formerly unprotected under the first amendment, see,
e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), has in recent years received substantial first amendment protection. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 366-82
(1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1977);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). But, for reasons more elaborately examined elsewhere, these cases may more
appropriately be viewed as part of a renewed interest by the Supreme Court in
rights of property and of entrepreneurial prerogative. See Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principleof Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer, 1980, at 66.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 270.
23. 403 U.S. 29, 32 (1971).
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claring that the same highly protective view of the first amendment
would also apply to private persons attracting general interest. That
free speech would be given robust protection indeed was signaled
in the principal obscenity decision of Redrup v. New York 2 4 in
1967: Not only was the "most vulnerable" person test of Regina
v. Hicklin25 regarded as altogether impermissible under the first
amendment, but whatever the sexual explicitness of material, as
long as it was neither thrust upon unwilling adults nor vended to
minors, the first amendment completely insulated it from police in26
terference.
That the Court meant seriously what it said about "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech was never made clearer
than in the 1971 decision of Cohen v. California,27 reversing a
breach-of-peace conviction of one exhibiting his views of the
Vietnam War by the plainly visible words "Fuck the Draft" on his
jacket, worn in the public corridors of the Los Angeles county
courthouse. Not the least remarkable feature of the case was that it
was not Mr. Justice Douglas who wrote the majority opinion so
powerfully applying the first amendment. Rather, it was "conservative" Justice Harlan who did so. That the public forum was very
broad was also confirmed in Brown v. Louisiana,28 the 1966 decision reversing a breach-of-peace conviction for a silent protest
vigil inside the anteroom of a public library. It was followed by
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ,29 extending
the first amendment even into the parking lot of a private shopping
mall as a place where nondisruptive picketing could not be enjoined. And in 1969, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio30 reformulated the clear and present danger test more concretely to provide fuller first amendment protection even for criminal advocacy

24.

386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).

25. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868); see text accompanying note 12 supra.
26. Redrup v. New York was a per curiam decision that had an important impact upon subsequent obscenity cases. The Court in Redrup suggested that the first
amendment bars any conviction for obscenity unless the defendant has: (1) sold the
alleged material to juveniles; (2) thrust the material upon unwilling adults; or (3)
made sales in a "pandering" fashion, i.e., advertising that emphasizes the sexually
titillating nature of the material. Subsequently, courts utilized Redrup to reverse
many obscenity convictions. See Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity:
Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 188 nn. 95-97 (1969).
27. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
28. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
29. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9' 1

than can be found in any previous single case. "The constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press," the Court declared, "do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
3
or produce such action." '
These were, by any fair reckoning, the brightest days for robust free speech and press we have seen in the American Republic. Some no doubt also regard them as among our worst, marked
by a declining civility, a shrillness, and a constitutional permissiveness sometimes verging on social anarchy. Be that as it may,
they clearly marked the high valuation of free-speech and freepress rights under a powerful and controlling first amendment.
And that decade is now long gone. Metromedia has been overruled, 32 and the constitutional law of libel is now so very complicated once again that editors must be extremely careful before
publishing materials that juries might find damaging to reputation.
Logan Valley has been overruled as well, 3 3 so that the dimensions
of the public forum available to lower classes have shrunk back to
streets and to parks. The Redrup "test"34 that adults may elect to
read or see whatever they wish from the marketplace, without the
state's presuming to sanitize that marketplace, is overruled. 3 5 Instead, such material may be totally criminalized except when
judges deem it to be possessed of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 3 6 And in these and in other decisions 37 of
the past decade, we are made fully mindful that constitutional

31. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (repudiating the
plurality opinion in Metromedia). See also cases cited at note 3 supra; Note, Whither
the Limited-Purpose Public Figure?, 8 HOFSTBA L. REv. 403, 423 (1980) ("Since
Gertz the Supreme Court has enhanced the protection of individual reputations by
continually refining the public-figure category; the result has been less protection for
the press.").
33. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). But cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S.Ct. 2035 (1980) (upholding California constitutional
provision permitting exercise of free speech on privately owned shopping center
property).
34. 386 U.S. 767 (1967); see text accompanying note 24 supra.
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
36. Id. at 24, 26. For a recent example of how the reigning "standard" operates,
see Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); cases
cited at notes 10-11, 13-14 supra.
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provisions are by no means self-defining or self-executing; they depend most conspicuously upon the temper, background, mood, and
commitment of judges granted the power to apply them. Lately,
free-speech and free-press rights have run into a new mood-a
mood that esteems repute more dearly than speech, majoritarian
notions of "decency" more preciously than freedom, and the exclusivity of property more emphatically than the communicative prerogatives of the relatively unwell-to-do. 3s
These passing observations may scarcely be consoling either to
the press or to libertarians in general. They are not offered for that
purpose. They may nonetheless impose some larger perspective on
the narrowness of press preoccupation with only those cases it finds
peculiarly offensive to itself. The decision in Houchins v. KQED,
Inc. 39 (sharply limiting access to jails), the judgment in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone40 (unleashing libel actions), and the opinion in Gannett
v. DePasquale4l (foreclosing coverage of pretrial hearings), drew
especially virulent editorial condemnation. 42 But there was nothing
special about these decisons: They are pieces in a mosaic descriptive of the seventies in which civility regained some slight edge
that it had lost during the riskier, frontier first amendment days toward the end of the Warren Court. These decisions merely bound
the press by limitations similarly binding upon others.
Finally, in one respect, at least, it may be well that this was
so. For if, as suggested in the quotation opening this brief section,
the press has a parochial tendency to take editorial alarm only
when its own freedom is discernibly at stake, perhaps it is just as
well that current first amendment doctrine makes no distinction
between newspapers and unaffiliated citizens. That "we all lose"
when the least among us loses is itself a thought worth remembering. That "the press" also has something at stake in the first
amendment, though "the press" is not now the particular litigant in
the Supreme Court, is not the worst doctrine we might want for
our Constitution.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See Van Alstyne, supra note 20.
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
443 U.S. 368 (1979).

42. E.g., Lewis, The Open Disarray of Closed Justice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,

1979, at A18, col. 1.
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SHOULD "'THEPRESS" BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY

THAN OTHERS? WHY, INDEED,

No SPECIAL FIRST AMENDMENT?
Though the press has not fared worse than others under the
first amendment, neither has it fared any better. Whether in respect to claims of access, privilege, libel standards, or still other
concerns, it has been treated generally the same as others have
been treated. There is, however, a distinct press clause in the first
amendment. Moreover, the press is frequently described metaphorically as a "fourth estate" of government, which nonetheless
institutionally stands apart from government, "checking" it through
vigilant inquiry, publication, and editorial criticism. 4 3 Accordingly,
the suggestion has been pressed with increasing frequency that
"the press" should be treated differently and better.
On foundations of language, logic, and function, a respectable
case can thus be made that "the role of the press" in relation to social justice requires not some "special" first amendment, but
merely recognition, long overdue, that within the existing first
amendment there is an explicit acknowledgment that laws valid as
applied to others may not be equally valid when applied to the
press. Among the several scholars, lawyers, and judges who have
urged that the press by some means be treated better, perhaps
Justices Powell and Douglas have put the point most emphatically:
"In seeking out the news," Mr. Justice Powell has said, "the press
. . . acts as an agent of the public at large." 44 Mr. Justice Douglas
has declared:
In dealing with the free press gnarantee, it is important to note
that the interest it protects is not possessed by the media themselves.... "The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the
public's right to know .... 45
Thus, the role of the press, whatever else it may also be, is allegedly first and foremost that of public fiduciary: To alert the public to defects and incidents of corruption in government; to dis43. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521.

44. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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cover and disseminate information about conditions otherwise kept
from public view or which, if not hidden in a legal sense, are
nonetheless unlikely to be discovered except by persons (namely,
journalists) whose vocation it is to search them out and bring them
to public attention as a catalyst for informed and democratic response. Though most important as a check on government, the responsibility of the press presumably extends to investigation and
reporting of the private sector as well-insofar as the public cannot
act with respect to private manipulations and abuses if it is kept
uninformed of them by restraints laid down by laws and/or court
decisions that throttle the press.
The argument, as best as I understand it, is therefore not that
private speech or personal writings should in any respect be newly
denigrated or deemed in any fashion less protected than each is
presently protected under the first amendment. It is, rather, that
in certain cases the vocational affiliation of a journalist with a
regularly published newspaper of general circulation must not be
regarded by courts as though it were without additional legal significance. 46 Allegedly, the press has a special first amendment significance of its own because a third-party first amendment
interest-namely, "the public's right to know"-is at once engaged
in cases involving journalists, whereas that vital third-party interest
is either not engaged at all or at best is only more remotely engaged when the case does not implicate the public's own champion, its fourth estate, "the press."
A single example may be sufficient to illustrate the argument.
Surely it is true that mere considerations of administrative convenience are more than adequate cause to disallow ordinary vendors
from forcing access to courtrooms, jails, and executive sessions of
boards of county supervisors to see whether someone there might
wish to respond to their solicitations. We have no doubt that this
exclusion raises no substantial first amendment issue, even if we
concede that, while within that courtroom, jail, or county office
meeting room, the vendor might notice things he might subsequently mention to others as "odd," disturbing, or out of the ordinary. Surely, it is also true, however, that we would not claim
there is no substantial first amendment issue when a New York

46. The theme is emphatically developed, and several explicit examples are
provided in Abrams, supra note 17, at 583-87. See also Nimmer, supra note 17; Sack,
supra note 17, at 633-37, 648-54.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 9" 1

Times reporter or an AP stringer presents his credentials at the
same door.
As a regulation of mere reasonable time, place, and manner, a
flat, no-exceptions prohibition on commercial inquiries in courtrooms, jails, and executive chambers is assuredly valid. 47 Conversely, even as a regulation of mere reasonable time, place, and
manner, a flat no-exceptions prohibition on news gathering in
courtrooms, jails, and executive chambers, however, is assuredly
doubtful-and almost certainly unconstitutional. 48 And Why? Presumably because the vendor's case only remotely engages any plausible public first amendment interest. In contrast, the journalist's
case seems at once substantially and directly to engage two powerfully combined first amendment interests: the first amendment
"freedom of the press" and, through the protection of that freedom, the public's "right" to know-a right without which the public's own freedom of speech can be but uninformed or misinformed.
I take it that the force of the argument for preferred press
treatment may be readily extended to other areas of frequent controversy to round out a wider circumference of first amendment
press rights in general. Thus, persons reposing confidence in private citizens who they anticipate might be subpoenaed to disclose
that confidential information may be less willing to share what they
know. But that potential loss of speech is one which is overcome
by the "fair trial" needs of a criminal defendant, the indictment
functions of grand juries, or even the legislative, fact-finding obligations of congressional committees. However, the case is arguably
a different one when the individual facing subpoena is a journalist
(who has come to some litigant's attention solely because the journalist's newspaper brought to public knowledge what the public

47. Although "commercial speech" (i.e., communication proposing a sale or ex-

change) is no longer orphaned from the first amendment (see cases cited at note 19
supra), it remains subject to time, place, and manner restrictions far more severe
than access restrictions applicable to noncommercial inquiries. Compare Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) with Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.

141, 145-49 (1943); compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426-32 (1978) with Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-62 (1978).
48. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). But is this

the proper comparison? Is there any reason to suppose, for instance, that a flat ban
on vendors in courtrooms would be invalid as applied to a newspaper vendor? Note
that subject to some equivocation, see note 60 infra, the Court in Richmond News
is careful not to undermine the position it took in Saxbe and Pell, see notes 44-45
supra, rejecting claims of "special" first amendment standing for "the press."
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will be unable to learn about at all if those providing journalists
with information must fear subpoenas). A reporter allegedly requires heightened first amendment protection, albeit not especially
for himself and not merely for the immediate benefit of his informant. He requires it, rather, in order that the public interest in
knowledge about serious matters not be impeded. 49 It is arguably
contradictory to lay upon a journalist a professional command (a
first amendment "duty" as it were) to report the results of his investigations to the public--and simultaneously subject him to conditions that render his performance of that very duty impossible.
Yet, if a journalist cannot guarantee confidentiality to his sources,
he often cannot perform his duty-and if he must go to prison as a
condition of doing his job as a journalist, then not just he, but all
the public, is worse off. Similarly, in ordinary libel cases a standard
of liability for "negligent" damaging falsehood may very well be the
appropriate general standard. But the self-censoring rules which
newspapers will be forced to adopt if that standard is applied to
them would compel them to suppress much truthful and important
material as well; "reckless" carelessness in publishing damaging
falsehoods should be required in damage actions brought against
capacity-lest the public's "right to
journalists in their professional
50
know" be impaired.
In these and myriad other ways, then, a "system" of differentiated first amendment freedoms for the regularly reporting press
can be articulated. Quite concretely, that system, if approved, may
ambitiously secure greater protection to the regularly reporting
press than to individuals in cases where public reporting is not involved or at best is tenuously involved. This system would provide
the regularly reporting press with: (1) More substantial entitlements of access; (2) more substantial entitlements of confidentiality;
49. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). (But note that if newspaper reporters were able to invoke some degree of first amendment privilege, the
"privilege" would not necessarily be different from or greater than that provided to
many others with first amendment standing. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).)
50. An excellent analysis defending the prudential wisdom of first amendment
doctrines against criticism that they are excessively protective (i.e., shielding false
and sometimes damaging speech unimportant to any first amendment value) is provided by BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978). As Professor BeVier
notes, such doctrines do not currently favor or disfavor journalists vis-a-vis others
who speak or write on issues of political significance.
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(3) more substantial protections from libel; (4) more substantial exemptions from injunctions; and (5) more substantial immunities
from searches and seizures. Moreover, to be fair to the argument,
let us be quite clear that at no point does this "system" of exceptional press freedoms presume to assert an absolute immunity.
Rather, it is a claim merely of a more limited accountability
founded on the special linkage of the regularly reporting press to
"the public's right to know."
If this appeal were otherwise sound, I do not think it would
be vulnerable to criticism merely because there will be foreseeable
difficulties in defining "the press." To be sure, that is a problem
which we do not now have, insofar as there has been no Supreme
Court ratification of this theory. No need has yet arisen in any case
to define the "regularly reporting" press, to distinguish "professional" journalists, or even to determine whether the theory is appropriately limited only to those who are "journalists" (rather than,
say, "authors" or "potential publishers"). But if the theory were
sound, objections based on difficulties of definition would obviously
not be conclusive per se. After all, those several state legislatures
that have already adopted statutes 51 establishing some kind of "reporter's privilege" have not found it impossible to draw some useful and presumably defensible lines. We have no reason to imagine
that the problem would be insuperable if, aided by those legislative suggestions, the Supreme Court were to constitutionalize a
52
"preferred" position for the regularly reporting press.
But despite the highly plausible logic that can thus be brought
to bear to define additional free-press protections, the case for
doing so is nonetheless very uneasy. Indeed, despite my own best
effort to restate the case convincingly, on balance the case may be
highly vulnerable on its merit. There are at least two reasons that
make it much weaker than it first appears.
For one thing, in virtually every instance where the "public's
right to know" is present-as the essential basis to assert a special
press claim-that special public interest will simultaneously be off-

51. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd) (Supp. 1980-1981);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976).
52. For an amplification of the argument that problems of appropriate defini-

tion alone are insufficient to balk at the recognition of preferred press rights, see
Abrams, supra note 17, at 580-83. For a concrete example of a "reporter's shield" law
(applied to defeat a civil libel plaintiff's discovery), see Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 277 (3d Cir. 1980).
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set and cancelled out by a countervailing reason of the same
weightiness. Ironically, that cancelling, countervailing reason is itself inseparable from what the public is made to know by the
regularly reporting press. Consider, for instance, the paradox of applying the argument of special protection to protect the regularly
reporting press more than others might be protected in libel cases.
An individual who carelessly defames another in a private letter or in the course of a conversation with a friend may, to an extent that he may thereafter be sued successfully for libel or for
slander, thus be more inhibited than he otherwise would be in his
speaking and writing. Recovery is nonetheless allowed, and such
recovery is deemed consistent with the first amendment, because
we do not suppose that free speech should always be subsidized by
those whom it palpably injures. 53 Rather, the libeler or slanderer is
occasionally made to bear the cost of provable harm resulting from
his speech or writing, and we do not regard this as inconsistent
with the first amendment. The argument to require something
more before a newspaper or journalist may be held liable in a like
circumstance, we have seen, is predicated on the theory that the
journalist is fiduciary of the public's right to know. Though the
same observation applies to the individual, who may be inhibited
from speaking or writing true statements as well as falsehoods, the
loss of the public's right to know is not thought to be of the same
magnitude.
On the other hand, the very fact that the careless falsehoods of
a journalst are published in a newspaper of general circulation-that they are not just spoken to a single friend or written in a
single private letter-commensurately magnifies the injury done to
the defamed person. Surely it would be most ironic if, in cases of
defamation, the rule of law were that (a) the greater the circulation
of the libel to the public, then (b) the greater the constitutional
privilege of the libeler.
Exactly the same cancelling consideration applies against special claims by reporters in regard to the general conflict of "fair
trial" and "free press." An individual who would tell others that he
knows of evidence the prosecution possesses but cannot use 54 may
53. The point is made forcefully in a recent article by Professor Ingber who developed quite a powerful argument for reinstating libel actions albeit with far more
elaborate refinements than current doctrine recognizes. See Ingber, supra note 17, at
850-58.
54. E.g., evidence excluded under some mere rule of evidence or evidence
barred by operation of a constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule.
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have only a trivial effect on the ability of the accused to secure a
fair trial; if the teller's tale is but a fragment of private, circulating
gossip, there may be little difficulty in impaneling a literate jury
neither affected by nor even aware of it. However, if a journalist
publishes the same story in his newspaper of general circulation
(the very condition of invoking "the public's right to know") the
danger posed by pretrial publication is far more clear and present
than were a newspaper of general circulation not involved. Again,
it would be ironic if the rule of law in pretrial-restraint cases were
that (a) the greater the likelihood that publication will increase the
difficulties of securing a fair and impartial jury, then (b) the greater
the constitutional exemption of the publisher from pretrial restraints.
In some measure, the same observation can be offered as well
in attempting to apply the theory of preferred protection for the
press even in respect to confidentiality of news sources. Superior
protection of such confidentiality is thought to be important because the public (and not just the newspaper) will suffer if individuals supplying information must fear the subsequent disclosure of
their identities. On the other hand, superior protection from forced
disclosure of news sources may also mean merely that journalists
are at greater liberty to invent the news; a priori, greater immunity
from having to validate a story plainly can be as much an incentive
for sensationalized fiction as for the fearless reporting of actual corruption. And we have ample a posteriori experience in this country
to know that the supposition is true. The regularly reporting press
in the United States includes the National Enquirer, True Detective, The Globe, and an enormous staple of lesser tabloids and
journals, as well as the New York Times and The Christian Science
Monitor. Again, it would be a most peculiar rule of law which
would provide that (a) incentives for profit by fictionalizing stories
in the regularly reporting press (and exceptional protection of
source confidentiality is one such incentive) should be greater than
(b) incentives furnished to those not published either generally or
for profit.
None of this is to say that "the press" should therefore be
treated less well 55 under the first amendment than unaffiliated per55. Although that, in fact, was the original manner in which the press was distinguished under English law. See note 71 infra and accompanying text. May it have
been explicitly to insure that "speech," though mass-produced by inexpensive
presses, was not to be treated on that account as systematically different from more
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sons, isolated pamphleteers, etc. But insofar as "the public's right

to know"'56 is invoked as the principled distinction to establish

preferred status for the regularly reporting press, it is a distinction
that assuredly cuts both ways. The conjunction of freedom of the
press with "the public interest" is a conjunction a priori adequate
to distinguish the regularly reporting press from all others, to be
sure. But the distinction it yields is logically a distinction that may
render newspapers more, rather than less, accountable for what

they publish: (a) less entitlement to withhold sources (in order that
the public may know the source and thus be better able to judge

for itself the credibility of the report); (b) less immunity from
pretrial restraint (in order that the accused not be substantially

handicapped in securing a fair trial); and (c) greater liability for
damaging and false reports (in keeping with the magnitude of
reputational harm commensurate with public circulation of the
falsehood from a seemingly credible source).
To make the point plainer still, consider the comparison be-

tween "special" first amendment protections for journalists, and

"special" first amendment protections for academics. 57 It
is now
fairly familiar learning that at least in respect to their professional
utterances (e.g., their selection of material for use in the classroom), public school teachers and public university professors are
protected by a latitude of first amendment protection greater than

that which can be successfully asserted by other kinds of public
employees-protection identified with their "academic" freedom,
i.e., their duties as academics. 5 8 What is less frequently noted in

ordinary (i.e., oral) expression, that the first amendment was composed as it was?

Compare Abrams, supra note 17, with Lange, supra note 17.
56. For a recent, highly critical review of this alleged right, see BeVier, An
Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980).
57. See generally R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, in
1 ENCYLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 384-87 (1930). For discussions at-

tempting to develop a coherent first amendment subset of "academic freedom" (as
distinct from protecting faculty members merely as citizens in respect to speaking
and writing nonprofessionally about controversial political subjects, see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968)); see Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issues of Civil Liberty, in
THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972).

58. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-55 (N.D. Ala.
1980); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968), is paradigmatically an academic freedom case, but was in fact decided wholly without reference to academic freedom.
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respect to academic freedom, however, is that it is by no means a
one-way street, that is, it is not a concept that merely enlarges the
first amendment status of academics. It is quite true that first
amendment-rooted claims of academic freedom will enable a professional educator to address theories pertinent to the general subject of his instruction, and/or to utilize certain instructional materials despite the contrary demand of the state, and to resist the state
on a first amendment claim of academic freedom. It is also true,
however, that there is a trade-off properly imposed upon professional academics. While they may defend against charges of
insubordination-insofar as they ignore public law directives that
foreclose a professionally defensible treatment of a given subjecton grounds of academic freedom, they are simultaneously subject
to a professionally taxing standard of accountability. That is, academics are subject to a higher standard of care than one of but ordinary, layman's care.
An academic cannot be discharged because of the felt perniciousness of what he exposes as a germane theory in a course on
political theory, on anthropology, on psychology, on astronomy. He
may readily be discharged insofar as the presentation lacks professionalism, however, though publication of the same unprofessional
(or merely nonprofessional) presentation in general would not be
punishable and would, rather, merely enrich the author.59 The first
amendment frees the general public to be "careless" in declaring
what the law is, in writing and in publishing what the law is,
though anything more than the most casual investigation would
have disclosed that the cases relied upon and cited in the presentation have long since been overruled, or the statute said to be dispositive has in fact been repealed. Chronic carelessness of this
genre is more than adequate cause to propose the termination of
an academic, however, and not "despite" claims of academic freedom but, rather, as implicitly consistent with special academic
obligation-an obligation of professional care. The "system" of first
amendment academic freedom is, in this respect, symmetrical:
atypical prerogatives of professional discretion in the selection and
presentation of teaching and research; atypical requirements of accountability applicable to the professional.
Equivalently, were journalists to be "specially" regarded under the press clause of the first amendment, the question is an
59. See the discussion in Van Alstyne, supra note 57,
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open one: In what respects might they be "special"? One answer
(not the answer some of the press may have been thinking about) is
that they are to be "specially" accountable, i.e., more answerable
than laymen. A symmetry may thus emerge in respect to reporters
that trades off some special advantages for some special liabilities.
For instance, if journalists may assert access to certain public facilities either in "first amendment preference" to laypersons (as when
space is limited)60 or in first amendment exclusion of laypersons (as
when the meeting is "closed"), it may follow symmetrically that the
ensuing published story must meet a standard of professionalism
commensurate with the privileged standing of the reporter. A
"careless" story, a story misreporting what was said, a story shaded
to leave out of account pertinent counterpoints developed in the
course of the meeting, thus becomes professionally irresponsible,
giving rise to the termination of the journalist's employment and/or
liability. By no means, however, would such a story be adequate to
sustain a cause of action for damages, a retraction, or something
else if published on the authority of one acquiring it under no
claim of special first amendment access. The point does not necessarily mean that journalists (and their newspaper employers) can
make no case at all for special first amendment treatment. It does,
however, indicate that they must simultaneously take into account
the full, logical implications of that treatment.
A second, intimately related consideration also suggests that
the press should not advance a claim to preferred first amendment
treatment as a fiduciary of "the public" and the public's vaunted
"right" to know. Currently, despite the colloquial identification of
the press as "a fourth estate," insofar as the press has power of its
own (that often usefully checks and balances the established power
of government) it may operate most effectively and most legitimately precisely because it forms no part of government. Each
journal, whether trashy and truckling or fearless and admirable,
does not now submit its editorial autonomy to public regulation.
60. Dicta in Richmond Newspapers raise this as a real possibility. See 100 S.
Ct. at 2830 n.18 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2840 n.3 (Stewart, J.,concurring). Compare those two with the more careful noting of the problem by Mr. Justice
Brennan. Id. at 2832 n.2 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring in judgment). This way
of resolving "scarcity" of access by conferring special preferred access rights upon
journalists (or, indeed, upon only certain journalists) may at once be employed to
impose a legal demand of greater accountability, accuracy, and care of what they
alone are thus especially privileged to see and to record. See text accompanying note
72 infra.
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The point is an important one. It was made most emphatically in
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 61 invalidating a state statute requiring a
newspaper to furnish "reply" space to any candidate for public office dealt with in disparaging fashion by that paper. Quoting
Chafee's observation that "liberty of the press is in peril as soon as
2
the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper,"r
the Court denied the propriety of a statute that attempted, even to
the extent to furnishing a mere right of personal reply, to interfere
with the editorial autonomy of newspapers. In doing so, the Court
was but echoing an observation offered more than a century and a
half earlier by Thomas Jefferson:
I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our newspapers have
passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit
of these who write them . . . It is however an evil for which
there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the
press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.6 3
It is exactly the same spirit that led Mr. Justice Douglas in C.B.S.

v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 64 to disagree vigorously with the very
different holding of the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 65 which sustained the FCC's regulatory demand that radio
and television licensees at once notify and offer free reply time to
any person dealt with disparagingly in the context of some controversial public topic. "Both TV and radio news broadcasts, Douglas
noted, "frequently tip the news one direction or another and even
try to turn a public figure into a character of disrepute." 6 6 "Yet,"
he quite rightly observed, "so do the newspapers and the maga61. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
62. 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947),
quoted at 418 U.S. at 258.
63. T. JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (S. Padover ed. 1939). See also Jefferson's
reflections on newspapers in his letter to John Norvell, written in 1807:

Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle .... I will add, that
the man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who
reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he
whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell, from Washington (June 11, 1807), reprinted in part in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 581,
581 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS JEFFERSON].
64. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
65. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (Justice Douglas did not participate in the Red Lion
case.).
66. 412 U.S. at 155 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment).
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zines and other segments of the press. The standards of TV, radio,
newspapers, or magazines-whether of excellence or mediocrity67
are beyond the reach of Government."
But note at once how this important security of the fourth estate from the encumbrance of public regulation respecting the content of private commercial publications may be at risk if one's accent is not on the freedom of the press but is, rather, on the
public's right to know. In the Red Lion case, the Court accepted
the view that radio and television are not like newspapers and
magazines; they are, rather, licensees permitted special access to a
limited number of airwaves which are awarded without charge.
The superior and exclusive access right provided to a given licensee for a particular wavelength and territory is not determined by
some random lottery among applicants; it is determined by choosing among rival applicants the one whose proposed programs will
best serve "the public interest," with each such licensee "agreeing"
as well to abide by additional program content regulations believed
to assure that public interest. Here, the Supreme Court declared,
"[Ilt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
68
broadcasters, which is paramount."
It takes little imagination to understand how readily adaptable
that dictum would be to any claim a newspaper might make successfully for special first amendment treatment linked to the "public
right to know." As some say, "[i]n dealing with the free press
guarantee, it is important to note that the interest it protects is not
possessed by the media themselves,- 69 but by the public. That
view, however, has double-edged implications. If only an accredited newspaper reporter may inspect a jail, though a member of
the NAACP, a representative of some splinter political party, or a
feature writer of a pulp magazine may not, then surely it will become reasonable to attach strings to the privilege so extended to
"accredited" journalists alone. If only members of "the [special]
press" may attend a pretrial suppression hearing, undoubtedly it
seems just to impose additional restrictions of "fairness" and limitation on the story the press reporters are privileged to file. If reporters can be successfully sued for libel only if their damaging
falsehoods were "reckless," while common back fence gossips may
be successfully sued for merely "negligent" libel, then surely it is
67.

Id.

68. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (dictum) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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also fair for reporters to be more, rather than less, subject to subpoenas and written interrogatories compelling disclosure of their
sources-to determine whether in fact they were reckless. The
greater privilege of a reporter in regard to defamation (to serve the
public's right to know) may entail a greater duty (to serve the public's right to know his sources)-or so, at least, a consistent,
logical,
70
and altogether straightforward argument can be made.
Not long after William Caxton introduced the first "modem"
press to England (a Guttenburg press with movable type), the
Crown recognized the special ability of such instruments to reach
large audiences cheaply. The recognition that the press was therefore "special" developed virtually at once into a regime of special
regulation: No press could be owned except as registered, and
nothing could be printed save what the Stationer's Monopoly and
Star Chamber determined to be in the public interest. Precisely
because the press was special in its capacity to influence the public's "right to know" in England, it was thought suitable to impose
71
a special order to secure it from unsafe and promiscuous uses.
Today's deja vu of that controversy is cosmetically distinguishable. While each owner of a mimeograph machine or each person
with access to a Xerox copier is not so inextricably linked with the
public interest to warrant distinctive treatment under the first
amendment, working journalists and most if not all of the
regularly reporting press may be thus distinctively linked. As to
them, the issue is not fundamentally different from what it became
in England, after 1476. It is recast in terms of the separateness of
the press clause and notions of fiduciary privilege to serve "the
public right to know." But the lure is still to command their separation from others also sheltered by the first amendment-to find
"different" standards suitable for "the press."
To be sure, we have been examining the controversy from the
perspective of argument that seeks only specially to advantage "the
press," rather than to disadvantage it. But the difficulty of the argument is that the best reasons for favoring a privileged press are

70. For a discussion of techniques of imposing access rights to newspapers on
behalf of third parties, based partly on arguments directed against every sort of any
special governmental aid involved in the newspaper business, see Yackle, Confessions of a Horizontalist: A Dialogue on the FirstAmendment, 27 KAN. L. REv. 541
(1979).
71. See F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776 (1952),
and the several references in W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1924).

See also Abrams, supra note 17, at 575 n.79 (1979).
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identically the best reasons for imposing special burdens upon that
same press. We have carried over from the English libel per se,
and we have already imposed upon radio and television substantial
"public" obligations-in exchange for exclusive, cost-free licensing
privileges-that illustrate how these trade-offs tend inevitably to
work themselves out. 72 There is no reason to suppose that the mat-

ter will be different for newspapers should they, too, "succeed" in
securing particular rights, privileges, exemptions, or immunities
that a crank pamphleteer, for example, cannot claim under a single
73
and indivisible amendment.
My own conclusion is, therefore, that it is not infeasible to define a class of journalists and to give special first amendment protections to those scriveners. Rather, it would be a mistake to do so.
Presumably the definitional line would have to be drawn in relation to the cohort of journalists who are "responsible," who will not
merely march to their own interests or those of commercial publishing firms, but who faithfully abide by "public interest" standards-standards that make them more like commentators on the
BBC: admirable, restrained, and less free than the muckrakers
and the lone pamphleteers. For all journalists to aspire to be professional, ethical, altruistic, and mindful of the public interest in
their work is assuredly desirable. It seems doubtful, however, that
either the press or the public would gain much from a constitutional separation that would establish caste distinctions within the
fourth estate: one group enjoying certain additional privileges, but
subject also to certain additional accountabilities; the "rest," indistinguishable from any person who may own a mimeograph machine, having only "ordinary" first amendment rights, but unburdened by the extra baggage of a fiduciary's "public" obligations. I
thus agree wholeheartedly with the well-stated conclusions of
Anthony Lewis, who covered the Supreme Court for the New York
Times for many years:
Freedom of the press arose historically as an individual liberty.
Eigtheenth-century Americans saw it in those terms, and the
same view is reflected in Supreme Court decisions; freedom of

72. See, e.g., Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast]Press," 55 TEx. L. REv. 39 (1976);
Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion,
29 S.C. L. REv. 539 (1978).
73. The same point is very persuasively developed in Blanchard, supra note
17. See BeVier, supra note 56; Bezanson, supra note 17; Lange, supra note 17;
Lewis, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 17, at 190-96.
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speech and of the press, Chief Justice Hughes said, are "fundamental personal rights." To depart from that principle-to adopt
a corporate view of the freedom of the press, applying the press
clause of the first amendment on special terms to the "institution" of the news media-would be a drastic and unwelcome
change in American constitutional premises. It would read the
Constitution as protecting a particular class rather than a common set of values. And we have come to understand, after much
struggle, that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." 74

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAKE?

This essay has addressed recent cases involving the press
wholly in first amendment terms. Admittedly very narrow in its
preoccupation with constitutional doctrine, it is by no means atypical in this respect. Statutory and common law developments are
doubtless of immense practical significance in their own right, but
we take it virtually as given that when we "really" wish to know
how safely or how freely publication can proceed against the persistent tendency to censor or to suppress, meaningful discussion
will turn at once to the first amendment.
Indeed, the first amendment may be regarded as so central to
the meaningful protection of free speech and press in the United
States, that even Tocqueville's familiar observation75 fails adequately to have anticipated the American propensity. It is not
merely that political questions in this country have tended generally to have become adjudicated questions; it is, rather, that the
most significant political and legal questions have tended to become constitutional questions. This appears emphatically to be so
with respect to speech and press. Whether the subject is contempt
of court, access to government places, privileges of confidentiality,
varieties of prior restraint, standards of libel, the actionability of seditious utterance or something else still again, they are all first
amendment questions with us. It scarcely strains the truth to suggest that in the United States, therefore, imagining a free press
without a first amendment is as difficult conceptually as attempting
to imagine a powerful Archimedean lever without a fulcrum. The
74.

Lewis, supra note 17, at 626 (footnotes omitted).

75. "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN

AMERICA 280 (Knopf ed. 1946).
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very idea is a paradox. The first amendment is the fulcrum; it
alone, ultimately, provides a reliable purchase for the leverage of a
free, diverse, and boisterously robust press in the United States.
The assumption of first amendment centrality is not, of course,
based simply on the presence of the amendment per se, that is, it
is not derived merely from the "pie in the sky" rhetoric of the
amendment itself: There is surely general recognition that a number of nations (including the Soviet Union) have some kind of
parchment facsimile to the first amendment-but of no equivalent
efficacy. Rather, reliance upon the first amendment as tending to
make a critical difference in conditions of free speech and press

takes into account not merely the amendment's own near-absolute
language, but its structural outfitting within the legal system as
well. That "outfitting" provides that the amendment has a positive
law (rather than a merely precatory) significance; the amendment is
established as part of the supreme law and discountenances all inconsistent lesser enactments. Its application is committed to lifetenured judges virtually unremovable by government. It may be
invoked readily in litigation by private parties. It is alterable as supreme law solely by federal processes of amendment quite deliberately stacked against the feasibility of precipitate changeextraordinary two-thirds majorities of both houses of the national
legislature must propose a change, unless, as has never happened,
concurrent resolutions by two-thirds of the state legislatures precipitate an amending convention, and that change will fail unless
three-fourths of the state legislatures separately concur in the
change as well. 76 One, or another, or all of these features are

lacking in India, in Korea, in Chile, in Saudi Arabia-to recite the
names of some few countries jingoistically included in the "free
world" to contrast them with "communist" countries-and insofar
as they are lacking, conditions of press freedom seem, from time to
time, to be utterly insecure.
Yet, if this much is true, it is also true that there are some national aberrations that would seem to give us pause. One such
anomaly is that our own most look-alike neighbor, Canada, has no
first amendment. The most recent efforts by the Canadian Prime
Minister to put a U.S.-style bill of rights into the Canadian constitution, moreover, have been rebuffed. As reported by the Asso-

76.

U.S. CONST. art. V.
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ciated Press in early September, 1980, Mr. Trudeau's effort encountered strong opposition because provincial leaders "object to
having the courts, rather than legislative bodies, interpret the ap-

plication of such basic rights as freedom of speech or of the press,

as in the United States." 77 In England, which we also do not reflexively dismiss as unfree or intolerant, the situation is the same.

In 1980, the basic law of England is as Lord Chief Justice Holt observed it to be in 1700. "An Act of Parliament," he noted, "can ' do
78
no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd.
In New Zealand also, free speech and press disputes are resolved
wholly without benefit of a written constitution. 79 And in Australia,
there is a written constitution and, as in the United States, it is su-

perintended by the power of judicial, substantive constitutional review. But the Australian Constitution has no provision extending
substantive constitutional review to the protection of free speech or

press, because Australia has no equivalent at all to our own first
amendment.8 0
77. Associated Press wire story, reprinted in Durham Morning Herald, Sept.
11, 1980, at 17C, col. 2. A similar account is given in N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1980, at
A3, col. 4 (city ed.). For a subsequent report that an effort would be made (as predicted in the N.Y. Times article, supra) to secure an entrenched bill of rights without
provincial approval, see Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
78. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1700). Evidently, the situation is essentially the same today: "In Britain, the phrase 'judicial review' is
merely a flattering way of describing statutory interpretation-the judicial approach
to which is confined by strict rules, though there are signs in recent cases of a more
liberal approach developing." Scarman, Fundamental Rights: The British Scene, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1575, 1585 (1978). See L. SCAPWAN, ENGLISH LAw 76-82 (1974).
For a recent review of developments in England, see Karst,JudicialReview and the
Channel Tunnel, 53 S. CALIF. L. Rv. 447, 447 (1980) ("The issue has not exactly
captured the British public's interest.").
79. For a recent review of legal developments in New Zealand respecting the
law and the press, see Burrows, The Law and the Press, 4 OTAGO L. REV. 119
(1978). While noting that there have been no prosecutions "for either blasphemy or
sedition in New Zealand for a very long time," id. at 122, Burrows also comments
that "that great journalistic event that we know simply as 'Watergate' would never
have got off the ground in New Zealand or Britain ....
Id. at 126. For additional
views of free speech, the press, and a Bill of Rights for New Zealand, see ESSAYS ON
HUMAN BIGHTS (9th ed. K. Keith, 1968).
80. For a recent review, see E. CAMPBELL & H. WHITMORE, FREEDOM IN
AUSTRALIA (1973). In their most pertinent chapter ("Constitutional Protection of Human Rights"), the authors observe that "[e]xamples can be found of Australian laws,
which, if judged by, say, the United States Bill of Rights, would probably be found
unconstitutional." Id. at 455. Still they conclude, "We oursleves have yet to be persuaded that a Bill of Rights, especially of the entrenched and judicially enforceable
variety, would inevitably provide better security against unwarranted invasions of individual liberty than is provided at present." Id. at 455, For two very recent com-
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Despite stirrings in each of these countries, moreover, there
currently appears to be no sufficient enthusiasm to adopt an
American-style constitution with a first amendment provision "guaranteeing" free speech or a free press from governmental abridgment.
In fact, therefore, it is not easy to match the actual conditions of
free speech and press by uniformly correlating one's impressions of
those actual conditions with the presence or absence of a first
amendment, akin to our own, enforced by an entrenched judiciary
equivalent to our own. On second impression, then, it is much
less clear what difference a first amendment makes. Our domestic
rhetoric (and "first amendment" preoccupations) suppose that it is
indispensable to the adequate protection of free speech and a free
press. Equally literate, English-speaking countries otherwise
sharing a common legal system evidently regard such an entrenched provision as altogether dispensable and, evidently, not
sufficiently useful even to be worth its occasional perplexities or
marginal social costs. It is implausible to suppose that we may both
be right about this matter.
It is quite possible, however, that "we" may both be quite
wrong-at least insofar as the respective positions as described
above do not significantly exaggerate the tendency domestically to
regard an entrenched first amendment as indispensable, and the
tendency among our Blackstone relatives to regard it as altogether
inconsequential. As the occasion to prepare this brief review of one
of our domestic first amendment issues was originally this larger
occasion-that is, to examine comparatively the course of freespeech developments among the several former western colonies of
England since the death of William Blackstone just two centuries
ago-inevitably the question of what difference the first amendment makes intruded itself into every comparison.
No confident single answer emerges, but I believe the American example, while much too frequently oversold (and thereby discredited by the extravagance of domestic claims), may yet commend itself abroad-at least, as in Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and in England, where conditions are not radically dissimilar from
conditions here, and where there appears little to dread from a judiciary itself not very radical and unlikely to run amuck. I mean to
extend this essay briefly, to offer a mild defense for this suggestion.
parative reviews of press rights in Australia and in New Zealand, see Hunt and
McCarthy, Why No First Amendment? The Role of the Press in Relationship to Justice, in AuMEjcAN/AUSTmAiAN/NE w ZEALAND LAW 133, 147 (1980).
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And to put the answer at the outset, it comes to this: A judicially
enforceable, "entrenched" first amendment is doubtless not indispensable to the maintenance of free speech and, assuredly, provides no ultimate check at all against a persistent general spirit of
intolerance. It may add a useful assistance to free speech and to a
freer press than may otherwise tend to find stable support in its
absence, however, and provision for such an amendment need not
be seen at all as requiring a "trade off' for other kinds of protection which the legal system of a country otherwise already provides. As an estimate of whimsy, in comparing the precedents and
writings among our western Blackstone cousins, I think the first
amendment may make about a 12% difference (a great deal less
than that in some areas, somewhat more in others)--not enough to
be startling, yet, oddly, just enough to make it a safe venture
-and thereby, quite possibly, a commendable one as well.
The principal problem with commending the first amendment
abroad is that it has been so extravagantly praised and extolled in
the United States (even as reflected in our tendency to invoke it as
a law of first recourse, rather than as a matter of last resort), that
literate critics abroad, once piercing the fraudulence of such a
claim, are at once inclined to dismiss the amendment as well. The
argument that no parchment barrier (even assuming it may be judicially enforceable) is either a necessary or a sufficient proof against
judicial vagary or persistent intolerance was made in this country
very early and equally forcefully and well. It was altogether smartly
put forward in Alexander Hamilton's own best argument against
the usefulness of providing a Bill of Rights. In Federalist 84,
Hamilton made his argument with particular reference to the
pointlessness of providing special protection for freedom of the
press, in terms I know to be still fashionable abroad:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it
to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on
the general spirit of the people and of the government. And
here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we
seek for the only solid basis of all our rights. 81

81. TIE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514-15 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. (1961))
(footnote omitted).
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The point is well taken; American history is littered with illustrations which amply fulfill it. The first amendment did not forestall the enactment of the Sedition Act 8 2 a bare seven years follow84
ing its ratification, 8 3 it did not keep away the Espionage Act
following World War 1,85 it did not inhibit passage of the Smith
Act8 6 just prior to World War II 87-and all of these were sustained in
highly repressive applications as- not unconstitutional abridgments
of speech or press. 8 Even publication of the Pentagon Papers (the
revelations of which were rather mild and whose compromise of
"'national security" was not at all self-evident) failed to command
unanimity of judicial protection against the effort to suppress that
89
publication.
Indeed, not until 1931 was a single state statute invalidated in
the United States by the Supreme Court on the ground that it
trespassed the constitutional protection furnished to freedom of the
press.9 0 Moreover, not until 1965 was an Act of Congress held invalid by the Supreme Court on grounds that it violated the first
amendment. 9 1 As literate foreign jurists are well aware, moreover,
sensitive and well-regarded contemporary American judges have
evidently shared Hamilton's very skeptical view. Thus, late in his
career (that included Nuremberg as well as our own Supreme
Court), Robert Jackson somberly observed: "I know of no modern
instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from the
great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny
which have threatened liberty and free institutions.- 9 2 Much to the
82.
83.

see

Ch. 73,

1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired March 3, 1801).
For a review of the early cases and a telling critique of the whole period,
L. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
84. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1976)); see

also E. HUDON,

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA (1963); J. LOFTON,
supra note 18; F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 333-44 (reprint

1970) (Phil. 1849).
85. The cases are fully (and critically) reviewed in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
86. Ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1976)).
87. The Smith Act is quoted, applied, and sustained in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
88. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
89. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
90. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
91. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
92. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 80 (1955).
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same effect is the equally familiar observation of Judge Learned
Hand:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court
can even do much to help it. While it
lies there it needs no con93
stitution, no law, no court to save it.
I am aware of no satisfactory basis for dismissing these complaints
because I think they are entirely well taken. Our own history
stands against the notion that the first amendment is a sufficient
condition against a general intolerance; it readily yields ample illus94
trations of zigzag vagaries of judicial "deference."
Nevertheless, it may also be true that these criticisms are actually too fundamental, i.e., that they presuppose too strong a case
proposed in defense of the first amendment, thus overlooking a
more moderate view of the matter. The case cannot now be made
and was not made in the beginning that the first amendment is either crucial or sufficient. Rather, the case was suggested, and may
even now be maintained, that it is simply more helpful than not.
Even the amendment's principal sponsors felt that it would be
merely so. Discussing the subject in his correspondence with
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson suggested that so far as relying
on the people, elevation of particular rights in a permanent, written constitutional text might at least afford a visible source more
helpful than mere omission as a reminder of those rights. 95 As to
the courts, Jefferson noted (in anticipating Marbury v. Madison96 ),
a "declaration of rights" will "put into the hands of the judiciary" a
"legal check" which, whatever the difficulties of marginal application, might be useful when popular sentiment flaggedY With no
illusions that judges would be either sufficiently resolute or able
without support to stand against every crisis, and with none that a
93.

L. HAND, THE SPIIUT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (1953).

94. For a recent critique, the very title of which sums up this thesis, see
Kurland, The Irrelevance of The Constitution: The First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. 1Ev. 1 (1979-1980).
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, from Paris (March 15,
1789), reprintedin part in THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462-64.
96. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 76, reprinted
in part in THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462.
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written Bill of Rights can per se keep the spirit of a free press
alive, Jefferson concluded with a moderate optimism that even now
seems surprisingly mature:
The declaration of rights, is, like all other human blessings, alloyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its
object .... But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all
circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up the building which
would have fallen, with that brace the less. 98
A very nice phrase, "A brace the more," which is probably about
what one would want: The first amendment as a useful reinforcement "not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances," but
"rarely inefficacious."
The reflections by James Madison, the principal author of the
first amendment, were no more pretentious than those of Jefferson.
Writing to Jefferson on October 17, 1788, but a few months after
the eleventh state had ratified the Constitution, Madison summed
up his view in favor of adding a bill of rights in the following diffident observation: "I have favored it because I suppose it might be
of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice." 9 9 Then,
a little less than a year later, addressing the House of Representatives in support of the Bill of Rights he has just proposed, his enthusiasm is correspondingly mild:
I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to
the Federal Constitution as to make it improper to ratify it, until
such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form, and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. 100
The value, he suggests in the same address in Congress is, in part:
"[i]f they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights." 10 1 And Madison's notes, jotted down

98. Id., reprintedin part in TiiOMAs JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462-63.
99. Letter From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, from New York (Oct. 17,
1788), reprintedin V THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269, 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904)
[hereinafter cited as JAMES MADISON].
100. Address by James Madison before the United States House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in V JAMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 380.
101.

Id., reprintedin V JAMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 385.
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to guide this extemporaneous address in Congress, sum up the
matter in this fashion: "Bill of Rights-useful not essential. ..."102
It is noteworthy that the vagaries of judicial construction, the
unreliability of Bills of Rights in times of felt crisis, their ultimate
inadequacy even against persistent majoritarian intolerance, are all
anticipated by our first amendment's own principal backers who,
presumably, would correspondingly find the actual subsequent political and judicial history of the first amendment no very great surprise. It is at least as noteworthy, however, that they could also
readily locate an impressive series of adjudications granting point,
purpose, and application to the first amendment when other
"checks and balances" on majoritarian and parliamentarian intol-,
erance have failed. 10 3 It appears to furnish about "12% difference"
for the better.
102. Id., reprintedin V JAMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 389.
103. Whether under the common law of seditious libel, the Race Relations Act,
the official Secrets Act, varieties of contempt powers, anti-obscenity (or "decency"
acts), privacy laws, disorderly conduct, breach of peace, commercial regulations, permit controls, parliamentary supremacy principles, or the simple absence of a "first
amendment" as the basis for resisting equivalent "laws," it is at least highly doubtful
whether equivalently protective decisions can be found among the English decisions
for any but a very few of the following cases: Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977);
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co., v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974);
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
Redrnp v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 274 (1967);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The vast majority of cases providing effective vindication of first amendment rights against state
and local measures do not generate any review in the Supreme Court. For an impressive recent example, see Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d 605,
373 N.E.2d 21, 14 Ill. Dec. 890 (1978).
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So modest a difference, though conforming well to the expectations of the first amendment's own endorsers, may of course seem
deflating. But it ought not be so. Rather, it may furnish some additional circumstantial evidence that, at the margin, an equivalent
provision equivalently superintended may usefully commend itself
to prudent persons in other nations not dramatically dissimilar from
04
our own.1
CONCLUSION

Most of this essay has been devoted to the recent rediscovery
of first amendment syntax. By paying a little more attention (than
has recently been customary) to the actual text of the first amendment, it has been noted that the amendment may mean that different kinds of protection are to be provided for press-related freedoms than for speech-related freedoms. Thus, the amendment
declares:
Congress shall make no law .. abridging
the freedom of speech, or
[the freedom] of the press.
In keeping with this rediscovery, it has not been much argued that
"the press" must include literally any person who may happen to
own or have access to any device capable of producing more than a
single copy of printed matter. So broad a definition as this, leaving
out virtually no one at all, fails usefully to say anything significant
104.

In their seminal review of criminal jury trials in the United States (the

right to such trials being a constitutional fixture of the sixth and fourteenth amendments, much as the right to free speech and press are constitutional fixtures of the
first and fourteenth amendments), Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel raised a similar
question: The extent to which juries made any significant difference and, accordingly,
whether as an institution, they were worth the bother. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). One part of their inquiry was to determine the extent to
which juries tended to acquit an individual despite ample evidence of guilt,
operating in this manner as an institutional veto on laws properly adopted and
doubtless constitutional but simply not acceptable to some juries. Their best estimate
was that the tendency of juries to do so was fairly slight, but nonetheless significant
at least with respect to certain kinds of crimes. Thus they note at the very end: "We
have noted that at this moment in history the jury's quarrel with the law is a slight
one. But there have been times when the difference was larger and such times may
come again." Id. at 499. Essentially, that is also what is being argued here with respect to the value of an entrenched first amendment as a limitation on parliamentary
supremacy: For the most part, the difference between the judiciary's perception of
what the first amendment allows and that of legislatures has in fact been a slight
one. But there have been times when the difference was larger and such times may
come again. When legislatures (and juries) share a joint intolerance, moreover, even
a modest difference of judicial review may be important.
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by way of distinguishing individual speakers or lone pamphleteers
from those to whom the latter clause in the first amendment may
in fact be specially addressed, namely, the press. Thus, to gain a
more useful start on the problem, the more commonsense notion
has been to begin with the most obvious and least controversial example of "the press," and thereafter to resolve the inclusion or exclusion of other parties by tests of functional verisimilitude with
that press which, at a minimum, is indisputably part of "the press."
The most obvious example of "the press" is the example of regularly
published, privately owned newspapers of general circulation. Emphatically these were part of "the press" in 1791 when the first
amendment was ratified. Surely they remain so today.
From this seemingly modest, attractive, safe, and altogether
logical starting place, "the freedom" of this press thought to be specially protected by the clause is linked by argument with the general public's power of self-government. By emphasizing the general
news-furnishing service of professional reporters associated with
regularly published, privately owned competitive newspapers, the
linkage with informing the public--acting as the public's "agent" as
it were-is thought to be very significant. Its significance is in two
parts. The first part is doctrinal, that is, it (allegedly) provides a
basis for determining what is the freedom of the press that explains
why the press may sometimes successfully rely upon first amendment privileges or immunities not available to others. The second
part is definitional, that is, it (allegedly) provides a basis for
determining who in addition to competitive newspapers of general
circulation may also be members of "the press" that is meant to be
specially protected by the press clause of the first amendment.
Doctrinally, the linkage between public information and newspapers of general circulation "as an agent of the public at large," 105
or as "bring[ing] fulfillment to the public's right to know,"100 is
invoked to expand press freedoms beyond the mere speech freedoms of individuals, by way of analogy to doctrines of ius tertii. By
relying upon first amendment rights in the public to receive information concerning public issues, and by noting that curtailment of
newspaper publication and curtailment of reporters' claims of access, confidentiality, and immunity must necessarily operate to cut
the public off from a primary and perhaps sole source of informa105. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tion germane to the needs of self-government, the description of
"the press" as public agent or fiduciary enables the press to argue
that the third-party first amendment claims of the public are inextricably bound up with its own freedom. Thus, special access to
courtrooms, legislative meetings, jails, etc., can be pressed in circumstances where the bar to entry might be valid against others.
Similarly, subpoenas might be resisted-more importantly to protect prospective sources of significant information than prior confidential sources-which others might not successfully resist. And
equally, limitations on liability that others might not successfully
claim may be asserted-lest the intimidating effect of broad liability result in excessively squeamish editorial reluctance to publish
anything other than demonstrably provable material. The general
direction of the ius tertii argument, in rounding out the wider circumference of "the freedom" of the press thus comes readily into
view.
Definitionally, the logical ramifications of "the press" as agentof-the-public-right-to-know may very well presume to revise our
notions as to what constitutes "the press." Currently, a politicalparty functionary, a merely curious citizen, an NAACP designee, a
local radio station reporter, a budding author, and an AP stringer
all have roughly the same first amendment credentials. Doctrinally,
the proposed view of the press clause we have examined would appear to favor the AP stringer in a variety of significant waysrelated to the press as agent of the public right to know-not applicable to the merely curious citizen. Definitionally, the local radio
station reporter is more like the AP stringer than like the merely
curious citizen. The political-party functionary, the NAACP designee, and the budding author are at the edge, arguably "in," but
probably "out." To be sure, each has some communicative constituency in mind (in the case of the budding author the likely constituency may be somewhat speculative), although none otherwise fits
any conventional notion of a member of "the press." Thus, in
terms of the functional verisimilitude of each such person (i.e., a
reporting and informing function), each arguably has some thirdparty standing akin to that of the conventional reporter. From a
less functional perspective of what may pass for a member of "the
press," on the other hand, each tends to fail.
The approach is generally very beguiling, however, and perversely, the fact that it introduces a "new" issue into constitutional
law probably actually adds to its attractiveness. Far from making
one quake at the prospect of having to deal with an issue we have
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not previously regarded as an issue at all, the idea of writing about
and adjudicating who shall be deemed a member of "the press" for
purposes of special first amendment privileges and immunities is
postively charming. It is the very kind of thing lawyers and judges
are most fond of doing: "Recognizing" a hard issue and proceeding
to draw lines, offering distinctions, making comparisons-and expanding the complexity of constitutional law.
Nevertheless, spoilsport as it is, the burden of this essay has
been to urge some further thought before rushing on like lawyers
to the thrill of defining "the press" for purposes of applying a separate regime of first amendment analysis. And the reason for
counselling such hesitation is not related to any problem associated
with any difficulty of defining "the press"; to the contrary, lines can
of course be proposed and the very prospect of redefining the
fourth estate is itself so exciting that one's desire to get on with
that task may make us impatient with any argument that would
postpone it or deny its importance. The reason is, rather, to take
stock of where this effort is likely to lead us, and what is likely to
follow quite logically from the success of our efforts.
Essentially, I have argued that the newly imputed importance
of relating freedom of "the press" to an "informed public" is a gift
horse whose teeth should be closely examined by the donee. Many
who link the press with a -public right to know in fact have in mind
a very logical and not-at-all-hidden agenda. It is the public agenda
to rationalize new laws more adequately insuring that "the press"
will serve the public right to know. It is the vision of a new
equalitarianism quite hostile to the old libertarianism. It contemplates that a specially protected press shall also be, accordingly,
specially responsive to community needs; that it not publish only
what its proprietors deem fit or marketworthy; that it be fair, reflect diversity, and provide access; that it take on by force of first
amendment doctrine what radio and television currently take on by
force of the FCC.
I have argued also that while linking "the press" with the fact
of its large audience may in some respects establish special privileges in that press, frequently the fact of the "large audience"
yields a reason for greater liability (and greater susceptibility to
prior restraints) than when no such large audience is implicated in
the utterances of an individual. The larger the audience, the
greater the danger of certain kinds of harm. Consequently, the
greater the danger of certain kinds of harm, the greater is the justification for more severe standards of liability to avoid those harms.
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The point, once again, is simply that the fact of "large audience,"
like the fact of "third-party interest," does not necessarily make for
more protection. Frequently it is the datum that justifies greater liability. Press buffs may have imagined that a separate regime for
"the press" must be all gain (and no loss) for reporters and for
newspapers. A different forecast would have it that a separate regime for "the press" may yield a handful of advantages and a harvest of disadvantages.
In the end, however, my objection is still more fundamental. It
is that the linkage of third-party interests is neither present in every case involving a newspaper nor absent in every case involving a
citizen attached to no publication of any kind. It therefore cannot
distinguish constitutional clauses, although it will often distinguish
constitutional cases. Forced disclosure of other members' names of
a widely disliked voluntary association, for instance, threatens the
first amendment freedoms of those other members and not merely
the first amendment freedom of the particular witness under subpoena. Insofar as that is true in a given case, it is a matter appropriately to be considered in determining whether, under the circumstances, the subpoenaed witness cannot be compelled to make
that disclosure. And when it is true, moreover, it makes no difference at all that the witness is not a journalist, a reporter, or a
member of "the press." Rather, it is an issue of proper first amendment solicitude that cuts across both clauses, applying "neutrally"
for such weight as it deserves. The same is true in reverse. An individual who calls a witness to answer truthfully as to what the individual actually said to the witness at some earlier time (which
discussion he now wants to be disclosed in court) has as good a
claim to require an answer whether the witness is a reporter or
whether he is some other person wholly unconnected with a newspaper. For the reporter to claim extra protection from having to respond to the very person whose actual conversation he now prefers
not to have to repeat seems very strange indeed; it makes no sense
at all so far as encouraging confidences by news sources when it is
the news source himself who wants it brought out. This would also
be the case if the witness were a doctor and the party seeking his
testimony was his patient, or if the witness were an attorney, and
the party seeking his testimony had been his client. Third-party
first amendment interests thus do not systematically distinguish
"press" cases from "speech" cases and, accordingly, cannot conceivably be serviceable as a litmus test either for defining "the press"
or for guaranteeing it a "preferred" position.
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